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PEOPLE v. MARIAN

In the United States, approximately 7.5 million people are stalked each year.1
Stalking is generally defined as a course of conduct directed at an individual that
would make a reasonable person fearful.2 Stalking is a crime under federal law, as
well as in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories.3 In 1999,
New York recognized stalking as a crime after research revealed that thirty per cent
of all women who were murdered were killed by a former intimate partner who had
stalked them.4 New York proscribes four degrees of stalking, varying in severity from
stalking in the fourth degree, a class B misdemeanor, to stalking in the first degree,
a class D felony.5 Stalking in the fourth degree outlines the basic conduct of stalking:
a defendant “intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person . . . [that] is likely to cause reasonable fear of
material harm.”6
Stalking is a common form of workplace abuse.7 Roughly one out of every eight
employed stalking victims reports missing as many as five work days or more because
of stalking.8 With changes in technology, the manifestations of stalking behavior have
broadened to “cyberstalking,” defined as “[t]he act of threatening, harassing, or
annoying someone through multiple e-mail messages, as through the Internet,
esp[ecially] with the intent of placing the recipient in fear that an illegal act or an injury
will be inflicted on the recipient or a member of the recipient’s family or household.”9
Yet, in People v. Marian, the New York County Criminal Court ruled that e-mails
sent to the victim’s work e-mail address did not meet the legal requirements of
section 120.45(3) of the New York Penal Law (NYPL), which penalizes stalking
someone at her workplace.10 The court found that a work e-mail address is not a

1.

Stalking Fact Sheet, Nat’l Ctr. for Victims Crime (Jan. 2015), http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/
default-source/src/stalking-fact-sheet-2015_eng.pdf.

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, ch. 635, § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws 3365, 3365 (codified as
amended at N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2017)). Another study showed that, out of a sample
of 141 femicide victims, seventy-six per cent were stalked by an intimate partner within twelve months
of the femicide. Judith M. McFarlane et al., Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide, 3 Homicide Stud.
300, 308 (1999).

5.

Penal §§ 120.45–.60.

6.

Id. § 120.45(1). Factors that increase the severity of the charge include: the age of the victim; whether the
stalker used a weapon; and whether the stalker has prior convictions for stalking, harassment, or
kidnapping. Id. §§ 120.45–.60.

7.

DOL Workplace Violence Program, U.S. Dep’t Lab., https://www.dol.gov/oasam/hrc/policies/dolworkplace-violence-program.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).

8.

Stalking Fact Sheet, supra note 1.

9.

Cyberstalking, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

10.

16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
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“place of employment or business” within section 120.45(3), despite the prevalence of
both workplace stalking and cyberstalking.11
This case comment contends that the Marian court erred in its statutory
interpretation by not only looking outside the statute, but by utilizing the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) to define a term from a criminal statute. The
court’s unduly technical reading of the information charge12 arbitrarily excluded
certain dangerous and prevalent behaviors from the reach of section 120.45(3).
Furthermore, the court’s reliance on the CPLR and civil practice to support its
holding was inconsistent with current case law and should not have been applied to a
criminal case.
In People v. Marian, the victim and the defendant were involved in a romantic
relationship and then broke up, which led to the events at issue in the case.13 In the
ninety-one day period from January 17 to April 17, 2015, the victim received over
one hundred Instagram and text messages from her ex-girlfriend, the defendant, and
approximately ten to fifteen e-mails, which were sent to her personal and work
e-mail addresses.14 During a three-day period, the victim received approximately
eighty phone calls from the defendant.15 On January 23, the defendant “accused the
[victim] . . . of assaulting her.”16 However, the defendant later admitted that this
allegation was baseless, and that she intentionally fabricated it to prevent the victim
from obtaining a restraining order against her.17 On February 25, the defendant went
to The Bowery Electric bar in Manhattan roughly an hour after the victim did.18
The victim had not informed the defendant that she would be at that location.19
Inside the bar, the defendant grabbed the victim by the neck and the victim asked

11.

Id. at 685.

12.

An information is an accusatory instrument that serves the same purpose in a misdemeanor prosecution
that an indictment serves in a felony prosecution: it “must set forth ‘nonhearsay allegations which, if
true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof.’” People v.
Dixon, No. 2014NY005400, 997 N.Y.S.2d 100, 2014 WL 3746803, at *5 (Crim. Ct. July 30, 2014)
(unpublished table decision) (quoting People v. Kalin, 906 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 2009)). It is not
required to allege facts that would prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[r]ather, the
Information need only contain allegations of fact that ‘give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a
defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.’”
Id. (quoting People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 2000)).

13.

Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685–86.

14.

Id.

15.

Id. at 686.

16.

Id. at 685.

17.

Id.

18.

Id. at 686.

19.

Id.
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that she leave.20 Instead, the defendant waited outside the bar for two hours and then
followed the victim for two blocks after she left the bar.21
A month later, the victim was at another Manhattan bar, Hotel Chantelle, and
the defendant once again appeared without the victim informing the defendant of
her destination.22 Again, the defendant waited for the victim to leave the bar and
followed her for two blocks, stating, “I won’t leave you alone. I’ll never stop.”23 The
victim testified that on March 30, the defendant went to her home after one o’clock
in the morning and waited outside.24 Later that day, the District Attorney’s Office
dismissed the false assault charges that the defendant had made against the victim.25
On April 8, for a third time, the defendant appeared at a bar where the victim was;
once again, the victim had not told her where she would be. 26
The defendant was arraigned on April 9, 2015, and charged with a misdemeanor
in violation of sections 120.45(2)27 (“Personal Anti-Stalking Statute”) and 120.45(3)28
(“Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute”) of the NYPL. 29 The charge under the
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute was based on the ten to fifteen e-mails that the
defendant sent to the victim’s personal and work e-mail addresses. 30 On May 18,
2015, the defendant filed a motion challenging all counts against her, including both
counts of the stalking charge.31 The defendant argued that the facts were insufficient
to support a prima facie case of stalking in the fourth degree under the Workplace
20. Id.
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 685.

26. Id. at 686.
27.

N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45(2) (McKinney 2017). Section 120.45(2) provides as follows:

Id.

A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for
no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and
knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: . . . causes material harm to the
mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following,
telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such
person’s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and
the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct[.]

28. Section 120.45(2) differs from section 120.45(3) in that conduct captured within the latter section must

cause the victim “to reasonably fear that his or her employment, business or career is threatened, where
such conduct consists of appearing, telephoning or initiating communication or contact at such person’s
place of employment or business, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.”
Id. § 120.45(3).

29. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685.
30. Id. at 687.
31.

Id. at 685.

306

VOLUME 61 | 2016/17

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

Anti-Stalking Statute because the victim’s work e-mail address was not her “place of
employment or business” as required under the statute.32
To establish a prima facie case33 of stalking in the fourth degree under the
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, the facts of the case must support a showing that
(1) the offender engaged in a course of conduct for no legitimate purpose; (2) the
course of conduct was intentional; (3) the conduct was directed at a specific person;
(4) the acts were committed with actual or constructive knowledge that such conduct
was likely to cause that victim to reasonably fear that her employment, business, or
career was threatened; and (5) the offender must have been told to cease the conduct
of appearing, telephoning, or initiating communication or contact at the victim’s
place of employment or business.34
The primary issue in Marian, and a question of first impression in New York, was
whether the requirement in the fifth factor, that communications be sent to the
victim’s “place of employment or business,” is satisfied by numerous e-mails sent to the
victim’s work e-mail address.35 The court began by stating that its duty is to construe
NYPL provisions “according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and
effect the objects of the law.”36 The court determined that the fair import of “place of
employment or business” was that the term refers to an “actual, physical location,”
noting that the CPLR requires a physical location for serving a summons and
complaint to a “place of business.”37 The court reasoned that, although courts in New
York have allowed service via e-mail on occasion, such is considered an “alternate
method of service” under rule 308(5) of the CPLR, which “indicates that an email
address is treated as something distinct from an actual, physical location.”38 The
Marian court acknowledged that the CPLR is not binding on a criminal court, but
defended its use thereof by stating that, without instruction from the legislature, or a
clear legislative intent to include e-mails in the statute, it was practical to interpret the
phrase “place of employment or business” consistently across all practice areas.39
The court determined that the phrase “communication or contact” under the
Personal Anti-Stalking Statute includes the act of sending an e-mail, but such
32.

Id. at 686.

33.

Id. at 686–87.

The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that an information allege facts
that would prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the information
need only contain allegations of fact that “give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a
defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for
the same offense.”

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 2000)).
34. See People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 41 (N.Y. 2003).
35.

See Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685.

36. Id. at 687 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 5.00 (McKinney 2017)).
37.

Id.

38. Id.
39.

Id.
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conduct is “completely subsumed” within the Personal, rather than the Workplace
Anti-Stalking Statute.40 It found that the defendant’s act of sending e-mails to the
victim’s work e-mail address also failed to meet the requirements that the conduct be
unsolicited, and that the defendant must be “clearly informed to cease” the conduct.41
Moreover, the court reasoned that because the legislature contemplated that the
Personal Anti-Stalking Statute would remedy the harm caused by such conduct, it
would not “effect the objects” of the law to provide a remedy for the same level of
harm under another subsection.42 Therefore, the court found that the victim did not
have a remedy under the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, and dismissed that
charge against the defendant.43
This case comment contends that the New York County Criminal Court erred in
dismissing the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute charge against the defendant
because it: (1) disregarded the principles of statutory interpretation and used civil
practice guidelines to define a term in a criminal statute and in doing so, employed
an over-narrow definition of “place of employment or business”; (2) supported this
narrow definition with assertions about the CPLR and civil practice that are at odds
with current case law; and (3) read the information in a restrictive and unduly
technical manner.
First, the Marian court disregarded principles of statutory interpretation by
failing to consult the textual construction, legislative intent, or legislative history of
the statute before turning to an unrelated area of law.44 Under traditional principles
of statutory interpretation, unless the court finds an ambiguity, the court must give
effect to the plain meaning of the text.45 If the court finds an ambiguity, then it
should look to the legislative intent and legislative history for guidance.46 However,
the Marian court failed to engage in a textual analysis to address whether there was
an ambiguity in the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute. Instead, it concluded that,
because the term “place of employment or business” within an unrelated statute, the
CPLR, is defined by courts as a physical location, the “fair import” of the term in
general, and specifically within the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, must be a
physical location.47
40. Id. at 688.
41.

Id.; see also People v. Kitsikopoulos, No. 2014NY037848, 16 N.Y.S.3d 793, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7
(Crim. Ct. May 13, 2015) (unpublished table decision).

42.

Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.

43.

Id.

44. See id. at 687.
45.

People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (N.Y. 2006).

46. People v. Ballman, 930 N.E.2d 282, 284 (N.Y. 2010).
47.

See Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 687. To support the statement that this was the traditional definition in New
York, the court looked to civil practice, invoking the definition that is used for the purpose of serving a
summons under the CPLR, “where the person is physically present with regularity, and . . . regularly
transact[s] business at that location.” Id. (quoting Rosario v. NES Med. Servs. of N.Y., P.C., 963
N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (App. Div. 2013)).
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The court’s reliance on civil practice resulted in a narrow definition of “place of
employment or business.” The court’s inappropriate deference to the CPLR caused
the court to frame its final inquiry as whether an e-mail inbox is a place where the
individual is physically present with regularity to transact business.48 But a work
e-mail address is a vehicle through which someone can regularly transact business;
thus, physical presence is not necessary. The court’s narrow interpretation is
discordant with the legislature’s intent to strengthen the law, which includes offering
victims protection from “[s]talkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront,
threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims.”49
Had the court followed the principles of statutory interpretation, it would have
found that “place of employment or business” was ambiguous and that its
interpretation is inconsistent with section 120.45’s purpose. Legislative intent
regarding section 120.45 is expressed in the statute from which it was codified, the
Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, which states:
The unfortunate reality is that stalking victims have been intolerably forced
to live in fear of their stalkers. Stalkers who repeatedly follow, phone, write,
confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably intrude upon their victims,
often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical harm upon them. Current
law does not adequately recognize the damage to public order and individual
safety caused by these offenders. Therefore, our laws must be strengthened to
provide clear recognition of the dangerousness of stalking.50

This statement illustrates that the legislature intended to provide strong protection
against stalking in section 120.45.
Another relevant piece of legislative history was an amendment made to section
120.45 in October 2014, just nine months before the Marian decision.51 The
legislative amendment stated that the meaning of “following” in the Personal AntiStalking Statute shall include “unauthorized tracking of such person’s movements or
location through the use of a global positioning system or other device.”52 The
legislature cited the increased prevalence of technology in stalking cases as the reason
for the modification.53 So, by the time of Marian, the legislature had already
determined that “following,” which in prior cases had been limited to a physical act,
could be done remotely through the use of technology. Had the court engaged in a
textual analysis of the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute, it would have noted an
ambiguity in the phrase “place of employment or business.” The court could have
48. See id. at 687–88.
49. Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, ch. 635, § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws 3365, 3365 (codified as

amended at N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2017)).

50. Id.
51.

An Act to Amend the Penal Law, in Relation to Stalking in the Fourth Degree, ch. 184, § 1, 2014 N.Y.
Laws 922, 922 (codified at Penal § 120.45).

52.

Id.

53.

Legislative Memorandum Relating to Ch. 184, 2014 N.Y. Laws 1693, 1693.
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found guidance in the legislative intent that would have led to an interpretation that
belied the one the court ascertained from the CPLR and civil practice.
Second, the court used outdated case law to determine that serving a summons to
an e-mail address is an alternative (less valid) method to traditional “nail and mail”
service because an e-mail address is not a “physical location,” as the CPLR requires.54
While e-mail is not a physical domain, even if it is accepted, arguendo, that the
CPLR’s definition of “place of employment or business” applies in a criminal context,
the court’s assertion that physicality is the reason for the distinction between e-mail
and other methods of service is not supported by current case law.55 Courts applying
New York law that have considered service through e-mail to be an alternative to
traditional forms of service have done so not because of physicality, but because of
concerns regarding due process and whether e-mail messages provide the recipient
with sufficient notice of a pending lawsuit.56 However, courts have long considered
traditional forms of service, such as publication, to be valid independent of their
likelihood of being received.57 Accordingly, as courts have grown more comfortable
with online service, they have increasingly upheld its validity as a form of service.58
Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. was an early case discussing the standard for
service through the Internet.59 In Fortunato, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted that electronic service had until then been permitted
only in cases when evidence existed that the electronic medium was actually used to
receive messages by the person being served.60 The court found that neither the
Facebook profile at issue, nor the e-mail address posted thereon, was shown to be
operational and actually used to receive messages by the party for whom the summons
and complaint were intended.61 Although the court in Fortunato did not think highly
54. See People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
55.

See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448 (Civ. Ct. 2008).

56. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.

June 7, 2012) (denying service via e-mail or Facebook because there was no evidence that the e-mail
address or Facebook page was in fact owned or used by the third-party defendant); S.E.C. v. Nnebe, No.
01 Civ. 5247(KMW)KNF, 2003 WL 402377, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003) (allowing service by
publication when there was evidence that service by the traditional methods was impracticable); Baidoo
v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 715 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that service via Facebook was a “method
reasonably calculated to give defendant notice”); Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 448 (allowing service via
e-mail because e-mail had a higher chance of notifying the defendant than publication did, when
traditional means of service were unavailable).

57.

See Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 447–48. As the Snyder court notes, “courts have long resorted to publication
of the summons in a newspaper as a means of alternate service,” id. at 447, and “[New York] law has long
been comfortable with many situations in which it is evident, as a practical matter, that parties to whom
notice was ostensibly addressed would never in fact receive it,” id. at 448 (quoting Dobkin v. Chapman,
236 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1968)).

58. See, e.g., Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803–04 (App. Div. 2013).
59.

2012 WL 2086950, at *1.

60. Id. at *2.
61.

Id.
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of improvised service by means of Facebook, subsequent cases have allowed electronic
service when the medium was shown to belong to the party to be served and that
such party actually used that medium for communicating.62
In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, the New York County Supreme Court upheld service
through Facebook.63 In Baidoo, the court distinguished the plaintiff ’s situation from
that of the Fortunato plaintiff, determining that the plaintiff sufficiently proved that
the Facebook profile was both operational and actually used by the intended party.64
In light of this finding, Baidoo not only allowed service through Facebook, but also,
in an unprecedented verdict, ruled that service through Facebook alone was
sufficient.65 Previous cases upheld service through Facebook as long as it was
accompanied by another method, usually e-mail,66 which demonstrates that courts
are growing to accept e-mail as a legitimate form of service.67 The Baidoo decision
stands for the proposition that the newness of service through social media is not a
sufficient reason for a court to reject it, especially considering that the overlap of the
law and modern technology is a concept to which courts must adapt.68
Further, had the Marian court looked to more contemporary and informed case
law involving service with process to businesses, it would have found the same legal
principles outlined in Fortunato and Baidoo.69 In Snyder v. Alternate Energy, Inc., the
New York City Civil Court for New York County allowed service to a work e-mail
address in lieu of a physical business location because the plaintiff could not locate a
place of business where the intended party was physically present with regularity, a
factor necessary to perfect service.70 The Snyder court found that despite the
likelihood that the intended party was operating out of an unknown, physical place
of business, service to an e-mail address was proper because the intended party
regularly used the work e-mail address.71 The court expanded the definition of “place
of employment or business” to include a virtual location from which the defendant
regularly transacted business because due process concerns were satisfied.72 The
Marian court neglected this trend in its discussion of civil practice case law.73
62. See Alfred E. Mann Living Tr. v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422–23 (App. Div.

2010); Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 488.

63. 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
64. Id. at 714.
65.

Id. at 716.

66. Id. at 714–15.
67.

Id. at 714.

68. See id. at 713–14.
69. See Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Civ. Ct. 2008).
70. Id. at 445, 448–49.
71.

Id. at 448.

72. See id.
73. See People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687–88 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
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Third, the court subjected the information to an unfair and unduly technical
reading, leading to improper conclusions that contradicted the very case law that the
Marian court cited in its decision.74 An information, similar to a felony indictment, is
required only to lay out the factual allegations of a misdemeanor charge in a manner
that “give[s] an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense.”75 The factual allegations
must be “adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the
same offense.”76 To require an information to go beyond this threshold is to subject its
allegations to an unfair and unduly technical reading.77 The Marian court reasoned
that even if it erred in its conclusion that a work e-mail is not a “place of employment
or business,” it was proper to dismiss the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute charge
against the defendant because the information did not allege that the e-mails were
unsolicited and the defendant was “clearly informed to cease” the conduct.78
Regarding the requirement that the e-mails must be unsolicited (uninvited and
unwanted), the court cited precedent from People v. Kitsikopoulos, wherein the New
York County Criminal Court found that the language “initiating communication” in
the Personal Anti-Stalking Statute “is clearly intended to cover only contact that is
uninvited and unwanted, whether electronic, in person, or by mail.” 79 The
Kitsikopoulos court provided that whether the communication is uninvited and
unwanted depends on two factors: (1) whether the communication emanated from
the defendant and was not invited by or in response to communications from the
victim; and (2) the effect the communication has on the victim, not the specific
content of the communication.80 As to the first factor, the court stated that the
information must allege that the defendant initiated the communications.81 To
illustrate the second factor, the irrelevance of the content of the communication, the
court contrasted signing an e-mail to a friend with “I love you” versus sending
multiple unsolicited e-mails to a friend asserting “I love you.” 82 The Kitsikopoulos
court counseled that the first situation would not meet the test for uninvited and
74.

Id. at 688 (citing People v. Kitsikopoulos, No. 2014NY037848, 16 N.Y.S.3d 793, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7
(Crim. Ct. May 13, 2015) (unpublished table decision), for the proposition that the phrase “initiating
communication” in the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute requires a victim to allege that e-mails sent to
a work e-mail address were unsolicited).

75. People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 2000).
76. Id.
77.

Id.

78. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.
79. 2015 WL 2235070, at *7. While Kitsikopoulos involved an information that alleged a count under the

Personal Anti-Stalking Statute, id., the basis of the “unsolicited” requirement comes from language
appearing in both the Personal and Workplace Anti-Stalking Statutes—“initiating communication”—
and thus the requirement pertains to informations that allege either charge. See N.Y. Penal Law
§ 120.45(2)–(3) (McKinney 2017).

80. See Kitsikopoulos, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7.
81.

Id.

82. Id.
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unwanted communication under the Personal Anti-Stalking Statute, but the second
one “easily could.”83 The second hypothetical situation is directly on point with the
facts of the Marian case,84 yet the Marian court concluded that the information
failed to show that the work e-mails, but not the personal e-mails, were unsolicited.85
Regarding whether the information sufficiently alleged that the defendant was
clearly informed to cease the conduct, the Marian court stated: “Specifically, [the
information] alleges that . . . the complainant told the defendant to leave the bar in
which she had accosted the complainant, but the defendant instead waited outside . . . ,
followed the complainant . . . , then continued to stalk the complainant for nearly six
more weeks.”86 The court concluded that this demand, as stated in the information,
was sufficient to inform the defendant to stop following the victim, calling her, and
e-mailing her personal e-mail address, but not sufficient to inform the defendant to
cease sending e-mails to her work e-mail address.87
The Marian court’s conclusions that the information failed to allege that the
work e-mails were unsolicited and that the defendant was clearly informed to cease
the conduct stem from an unduly restrictive and technical reading of the misdemeanor
information. First, the allegations in the information satisfied the Kitsikopoulos test
for unsolicited communication.88 As to the first factor, the information alleged that
the defendant initiated the contact by “bombard[ing]” the victim with various
communications, including the e-mails at issue in the proceeding.89 In relation to the
second factor, the uninvited e-mails asserted the defendant’s desire to be with the
victim, with the effect of causing the victim to fear for her safety.90 These allegations
satisfied the Kitsikopoulos test, and gave the defendant adequate notice to prepare a
defense to the uninvited and unwanted communication.91 Second, the allegation that
the victim demanded that the defendant leave the bar to which she followed the
victim, clearly informed the defendant to cease her conduct.92 However, the Marian
court found this allegation sufficient to inform the defendant to cease all conduct
except for sending e-mails to the victim’s work e-mail address.93 This exception
requires the information to go beyond merely being adequately detailed to prevent
the accused from being tried twice for the same offense, and thus is an unduly
83. Id.
84. See People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 685 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
85. Id. at 688–89.
86. Id. at 689.
87.

Id. at 688–89.

88. Kitsikopoulos, 2015 WL 2235070, at *7.
89. See Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685.
90. Id.
91.

See Kitsikopoulos, 2015 WL 2235070, at *3, *7.

92.

Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 689.

93.

See id. at 688–89 (dismissing only the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute claim for failure to allege that
the defendant was “clearly informed to cease” sending e-mails to the victim’s work e-mail address).
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restrictive and technical interpretation. Both of these conclusions subjected the
information to an unwarranted level of scrutiny, even though the information
provided the defendant with adequate notice to prepare a defense and would prevent
the defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.94
The court’s decision to exempt work e-mail addresses from the purview of the
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute is damaging from a policy perspective. It denies a
victim recourse against conduct that causes her to reasonably fear that her employment,
business, or career is threatened. The result in Marian creates a troubling situation
where a victim whose stalker calls her at home and at work has recourse under both
the Personal and Workplace Anti-Stalking Statutes, but a victim whose stalker
e-mails her at home and at work is limited to recourse solely under the Personal AntiStalking Statute. This loophole could potentially be exploited by cyberstalkers, who
can harm victims both personally and professionally.
The court underestimated the seriousness of this behavior by falsely concluding
that violent, threatening behavior is not present in an e-mail, and that it would
neither “promote justice” nor “effect the objects” of the law to consider e-mail to be
behavior the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute intended to prevent.95 This assertion
is legally unsound, because a conviction under the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute
does not require a threat of immediate and real danger; such a requirement would be
a legitimate reason to exclude e-mail from conduct targeted by the statute because it
entails an imminence that a remote communication like e-mail does not present.96
Furthermore, many stalking cases include e-mails with threats as severe as the
assault, rape, or murder of the victim.97 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the validity of online threats.98 The Marian court’s conclusion ignores the nature of
stalking itself: that a stalker purposefully selects a victim and persistently engages in
escalating conduct that is likely to frighten the victim.99 While each instance of
conduct might seem “benign . . . in isolation,” the collective conduct “amounts to
psychological terrorism when done incessantly.”100
Likewise, the court’s conclusion fails to recognize the undisputable truth that
just as the Internet has changed most facets of daily life, it has changed the face of
94. See People v. Cobb, 768 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Crim. Ct. 2003) (finding that requiring an accusatory

instrument to allege the specific, “actual date” by which the defendant was supposed to have registered
as a sex offender would be subjecting it to an unduly restrictive and technical reading because the
information alleged that the defendant had failed to register within the required ten-day period).

95. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.
96. See People v. Wong, 776 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
97.

See Joseph C. Merschman, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for Contemporary
Legislation, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 255, 256–57 (2001) (discussing severe cyberstalking cases that
included threats of murder and rape sent via e-mail).

98. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004–08 (2015) (discussing a defendant’s threatening

conduct on Facebook).

99. See Merschman, supra note 97, at 262 (describing the escalation to violence that is associated with classic

stalking behavior).

100. Id. at 269.
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stalking. A stalker is no longer necessarily a delusional malefactor who waits outside
your home, approaches you with unwanted tokens of affection, or ducks behind
corners and bushes while following you.101 Instead, through the evolution of modern
technology, a new breed of stalker has emerged: one who can follow, threaten, and
frighten victims from anywhere, at any time.
The court turned a blind eye to the realities of technological advancement by
excluding e-mail from the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute. In a time when many
people have their work e-mail on smartphones, and even more have e-mail access on
laptops, their employment relies on the Internet. Excluding a work e-mail address
from the purview of the Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute because it is not a physical
location keeps the court shackled to a narrow and anachronistic idea of employment.
Also, the court’s conclusion that the communication did not meet the requirement of
being unsolicited leads to the troubling inference that the victim wanted to be
bombarded by communications from her stalker. Finally, concluding that the victim
did not clearly inform her stalker to cease e-mailing her at work puts an undue
burden on the victim to further engage with her stalker to specifically list each
instance of conduct she wants stopped.
The unfortunate reality of the Marian decision is that a victim who is stalked
through e-mail to her work e-mail address has been forced to continue living in fear
of her stalker. The defendant in Marian repeatedly followed, phoned, wrote,
confronted, and unacceptably intruded upon the victim, likely inflicting upon her
emotional and psychological harm.102 The decision to dismiss the violation of the
Workplace Anti-Stalking Statute does not adequately recognize the damage to public
order and risk to an individual’s safety caused by this type of offender. With the
lion’s share of cyberstalking victims reporting having been stalked through e-mail,103
the Marian court’s exception likely leaves a large number of victims with insufficient
legal protection. People v. Marian fails to appreciate the clear danger that this type of
stalking entails and will only serve to subject victims of twenty-first century stalking
techniques to inadequate protections under outdated twentieth century laws.

101. See People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 40 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing a stalker who trailed the victim and

presented her with flowers as a sign of his affection).

102. People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 685–86 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
103. See Stalking, Bureau Just. Stat., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=973 (last updated Feb. 17,

2016) (noting that eighty-three per cent of cyberstalking victims were stalked by e-mail).
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